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It is a familiar thought from the rule of law literature and from everyday life that 
legal norms within a given jurisdiction ought to be consistent. However, little work has 
been done to explain this demand. This Article develops a theory of legal inconsistencies, 
both what they are and why legal systems ought to avoid them. In addition to contributing 
to a theoretical discussion of legal inconsistency, the Article also articulates a remedy 
under American law for those harmed by inconsistencies. The Article contends that legal 
inconsistencies violate Due Process. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Sixteen-year-old Cormega Copening faced an unusual prosecution. He was charged 
with possession of child pornography because his cell phone contained an explicit 
photograph of himself Some scholars think our child pornography laws are too zealous, 1 
others think the American suite of broad laws and tough penalties could go even further. 
2 
1. E.g., Amy Adler, The Perverse Law of Child Pornography, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 209 (2001) (criticizing 
sex panic surrounding child sexuality); Carissa Byrne Hessick, The Expansion of Child Pornography Law, 
21 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 321, 336 (2018) (noting and criticizing far-reaching definitions of child pornography); 
Carissa Byrne Hessick, The Limits of Child Pornography, 89 IND. L.J. 1437, 1451-61 (2014) (offering a narrow 
understanding of child pornography that better tracks the real harms that production of such material causes); 
Elizabeth P. Evans, Internet Access Restrictions for Convicted Child Pornography Sex Offenders: How Far Is 
Too Far?, 36 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoC. 329, 330 (2012) (criticizing extreme adverse action taken against former 
child pornographers, particularly court orders that ban them from accessing the Internet, concluding "while 
restriction [on Internet use] may be warranted in certain situations, a full ban on Internet access is not 
appropriate"). For particular criticisms of sexting laws, see Alexandra Kushner, The Need for Sexting Law 
Reform: Appropriate Punishments for Teenage Behaviors, 16 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 281, 288 (2013) 
("[S]exting should not be criminalized at all for teenagers who consent to it and keep the exchange private .... 
[C]riminalizing sexting can harm teenagers and be ineffective in addressing the sexting issue."); Stephen F. 
Smith, Jail for Juvenile Child Pornographers?: A Reply to Professor Leary, 15 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 505, 516 
(2008) ("With few exceptions ... , the heavy hand of the criminal law should not be brought to bear against 
minors who make or distribute pornographic images of themselves. Minors in this category should be regarded 
either as victims in need of help to turn their lives around or, at the very least, not wrongdoers deserving of the 
severe vengeance and blame society justifiably imposes on adults and others who sexually abuse children."). 
2. E.g., Belinda Tiosavljevic, A Field Day for Child Pornographers and Pedophiles If the Ninth Circuit Gets 
Its Way: Striking Down the Constitutional and Necessary Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 Free 
Speech Coalition v. Reno, 198 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 1999), 42 S. TEx. L. REv. 545, 571 (2001) (defending the 
constitutionally overbroad federal law aimed at stamping out child pornography); Kelley Bergelt, Stimulation by 
Simulation: Is There Really Any Difference Between Actual and Virtual Child Pornography? The Supreme Court 
Gives Child Pornographers a New Vehiclefor Satisfaction, 31 CAP. U. L. REV. 565 (2003) (arguing for laws that 
ban fake child pornography); Robert M. Sieg, Attempted Possession of Child Pornography-A Proposed 
Approach for Criminalizing Possession of Child Pornographic Images of Unknown Origin, 36 U. TOL. L. 
REv. 263 (2005) (developing a new legal theory to facilitate prosecuting more people for conduct related to child 
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Whatever the wisdom of such laws as they currently stand, something seems particularly 
odd about Copening's prosecution. Given our reasons for having child pornography laws, 
prosecuting Copening for possessing the picture of himself is not only unhelpful but also 
counterproductive. Through such laws, society seeks to protect children's privacy, but 
prosecuting Copening required the invasion of his privacy. Here, then, is an example of a 
prosecutorial decision that is inconsistent with the justification for the criminal statute. 
Copening was also charged with corruption of a minor for sending the same 
photograph to his sixteen-year-old girlfriend, Briana Denson. There is something strange 
about this too. In North Carolina, the jurisdiction where these events took place, Copening 
and Denson were allowed to engage in sexual activity with one another, even as minors.
3 
This means, as one commentator put it, "Copening and Denson came up against a 
counterintuitive confluence of laws." 4 To see this, consider the following question: what 
would justify a legislator in thinking that sight of Copening's body corrupts Denson when 
in the form of a photograph but not when he appears in person? Though one might 
disagree, it is understandable to claim that sight of Copening in a sexual pose always 
corrupts Denson, whether in person or in photograph. It is also understandable to claim 
that sight of Copening in a sexual pose does not corrupt Denson in person or in photograph. 
The confluence is more puzzling. Here, then, is an example of inconsistency between the 
justifications of two laws. 5 
This Article concerns inconsistencies in the law. More precisely, it concerns the 
Consistency Principle, a central component of the rule of law.6 Roughly, the principle 
provides that, within a jurisdiction, the laws should be consistent. This Article investigates 
the scope of the Consistency Principle, its justification, and what American courts should 
do when that principle is violated. 
The first part of this Article concerns the scope and justification of the Consistency 
Principle. Nearly everyone can agree that the Principle prohibits a jurisdiction from giving 
legal effect to norms that contradict one another, 7 but determining what counts as 
contradiction is far more complicated than previous writers have noticed. It is natural to 
believe that a set of laws satisfy the Consistency Principle so long as an individual can act 
in accordance with every law in the set. Upon inspection, this turns out to be too narrow 
an understanding of the Principle as the Copening case demonstrates. Deep inconsistencies 
surround his prosecution, but Copening was perfectly capable of acting in accord with the 
"counterintuitive confluence of laws." He just didn't. As for defending the Consistency 
Principle, some have claimed that jurisdictions ought to heed the Principle because 
pornography). 
3. Michael E. Miller, N.C. Just Prosecuted a Teenage Couple for Making Child Porn - of Themselves, 
WASH. POST (Sept. 21, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/09/21/n-c-just-
prosecuted-a-teenage-couple-for-making-child-porn-of-themselves/?utm term=.6519fdb248a9. 
4. Id. 
5. For a remarkably well-written student note discussing a related problem under Georgia law, see Emily L. 
Evett, Comment, Inconsistencies in Georgia's Sex-Crime Statutes Teach Teens That Sexting Is Worse Than Sex, 
67 MERCER L. REV. 405 (2016). 
6. Lon Fuller was one of the first scholars to state explicitly that the rule of law includes the Consistency 
Principle. LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 65-70 (rev. ed. 1969). 
7. Scott Fruehwald, Choice of Law and Same-Sex Marriage, 51 FLA. L. REv. 799, 830-31 (1999) ("[lIt is a 
basic principle of our judicial system that a person not be subject to inconsistent laws."). 
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otherwise laws could not fulfill their primary function, action guidance. 8 Upon inspection, 
this is also too narrow, and again the Copening case shows us why: inconsistent laws can 
guide action. 
The first part of the Article, then, is a theoretical argument, one that aims to show 
that the Consistency Principle has wider scope and requires different defense than others 
have recognized. This theoretical argument relies on the Copening case as well as several 
other cases of inconsistencies, historical and contemporary, domestic and foreign, to 
demonstrate that the problem is not merely academic. That real-life individuals have 
suffered from violation of the Consistency Principle prompts the second, more practical 
part of the Article. 
The second part of the Article develops a theory of legal relief for the teens ensnarled 
in the sexting case and, more generally, for anyone who suffers under inconsistency. Part 
II also responds to various objections to implementing that theory of relief. While there 
are other potential fixes for the specific problem faced by these young people, on the best 
theory of legal remedy, all violations of the Consistency Principle are unconstitutional 
denials of due process. 
II. TOWARD BETrER UNDERSTANDING THE CONSISTENCY PRINCIPLE 
The rule of law is a normative standard, usually understood as composed of several 
principles, all of which detail how a legal system can go awry qua legal system.9 Scholars 
disagree about the precise list of principles that the rule of law requires, 10 but many would 
agree that the rule of law includes the Consistency Principle. 
11 
8. Id. at 831 ("When a person is subject to inconsistent laws, that person cannot conform his or her conduct 
to the law."); Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REV. 781, 786 (1989) (offering 
an interpretation of Fuller on which the point of the Consistency Principle is so that legal subjects can know what 
they ought to do and perform accordingly); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., "The Rule of Law" as A Concept in 
Constitutional Discourse, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 8 n.27 (1997) (agreeing with Radin that the Consistency 
Principle can be "fairly subsumed by the requirement that law should be capable of being followed"). 
9. Jeremy Waldron, The Rule of Law and the Importance of Procedure, 50 NOMOS 3, 5 (2011) ("Theorists 
of the Rule of Law are fond of producing laundry lists of demands."); for just one list of principles, see Renaldy 
J. Gutierrez, Democracy and the Rule of Law: Myth or Reality?, 47 DUQ. L. REV. 803, 804 (2009) (citing the 
four rule of law principles offered by the World Justice Project). 
10. As Randall Peerenboom points out: 
conceptions of rule of law can be divided into two general types, thin and thick. A thin conception 
stresses the formal or instrumental aspects of rule of law--those features that any legal system must 
possess to function effectively as a system of laws, regardless of whether the legal system is part of a 
democratic or non-democratic society, capitalist or socialist, liberal or theocratic.... Thick 
conceptions begin with the basic elements and purposes of a thin conception but then incorporate 
elements of political morality such as particular economic arrangements..., forms of government... 
or conceptions of human rights .... 
Randall Peerenboom, Human Rights and Rule of Law: What's the Relationship?, 36 GEO. J. INT'L L. 809, 827-
28 (2005). Thin conceptions of the rule of law are advocated in the following: BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE 
RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY 91-126 (2004); Colleen Murphy, Lon Fuller and the Moral Value 
of the Rule of Law, 24 L. & PHIL. 239, 261-62 (2005); JOSEPH RAZ, The Rule of Law and Its Virtue, in THE 
AUTHORITY OF LAW 210-29 (2d ed. 2009). Meanwhile, thick conceptions of the rule of law are advocated in the 
following work: Corey Brettschneider, A Substantive Conception of the Rule of Law: Nonarbitrary Treatment 
and the Limits of Procedure, in GETTING TO THE RULE OF LAW: NOMOS L 52 (James E. Fleming ed., 2011). 
11. E.g., Jurian Langer & Wolf Sauter, The Consistency Requirement in EU Law, 24 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 39, 
43 (2017) ("[I]t is plausible that consistency (as a requirement of no contradictions) can be seen as an element of 
the rule of law."). 
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Some scholars claim that laws violate the Consistency Principle when and only when 
Law, obligates someone to do something that Law2 forbids. 12 To understand what such 
scholars have in mind, imagine that a truancy law required a student to be in school on 
Friday morning while a court summons required that same student to appear in court that 
same Friday morning. 13 If there were no exceptions to either law and no superseding 
principle to remedy the conflict, this would be an inconsistency of the kind that some take 
to be definitive of the problem. As I show below, this is just one kind of inconsistency in 
the law; it is what I call an irreconcilable inconsistency between laws. This name stems 
from the fact that a person cannot reconcile herself to the laws' demands, for she cannot, 
under any circumstances, remain in the jurisdiction and avoid non-compliance with the 
inconsistent set of laws. 14 
Though troubling when it arises, any given irreconcilable inconsistency is likely to 
be short-lived because courts and legislatures have tools specifically designed to remedy 
them. For example, legislatures and courts sometimes directly say in the text of a new law 
or ruling that any prior legal norm that is inconsistent with the current law or ruling is 
hereby null and void. This is a prophylactic measure to stop irreconcilable inconsistencies 
before they start. In addition to this prophylactic approach, there are remedies on the back 
end. Courts often decide, as a canon of statutory construction, that where two laws conflict, 
the later enactments supersede prior ones. 
15 
Despite being short-lived phenomena, irreconcilable inconsistencies receive most of 
the scholarly, judicial, and legislative attention in conversations about the Consistency 
Principle. This undue attention not only upstages more persistent kinds of inconsistency 
but also obfuscates the general reason why inconsistencies harm legal subjects. This Part 
of the Article focuses on the other kinds of inconsistency and on the obfuscation. 
To preview the latter point, scholars are confused about the general problem that 
inconsistency presents. They focus on a particular problem that arises with irreconcilable 
inconsistencies: the action guidance problem. It is probably beyond dispute that a legal 
system fails, qua legal system, if its norms cannot guide action. If nothing else, laws should 
guide action. 16 To be clear, this is part of the reason why the rule of law forbids 
irreconcilable inconsistencies. Because other sorts of inconsistencies do not pose action 
12. This conception of Consistency probably motivated Bruegger, given that he claimed, "It is impossible to 
simultaneously comply with laws that are contradictory." John A. Bruegger, Freedom, Legality, and the Rule of 
Law, 9 WASH. U. JUR. REv. 81, 87 (2016). But see, e.g., FULLER, supra note 6, at 69 (construing inconsistency 
very broadly as laws "that do not go together or do not go together well"). 
13. 1 assume that the school is not the court, and the student cannot be in two places at once. 
14. Once at a lecture, I errantly claimed that an irreconcilable inconsistency obtains when one cannot, under 
any circumstances, avoid non-compliance. Someone replied that one could always avoid non-compliance by 
suicide. This is not strictly speaking true, for suicide is not always an available legal out: a jurisdiction might 
criminalize suicide. Nevertheless, the reasoning behind the reply is right; sometimes one can avoid non-
compliance by leaving the jurisdiction, whether by death or emigration. I want to distinguish inconsistencies one 
can avoid only by leaving the jurisdiction from other kinds. The difference between this kind of inconsistency 
and the others will become important below, see infra Part II.A. 
15. E.g., Eisenberg v. Coming, 179 F.2d 275, 277 (D.C. Cir. 1949). For commentary on the lex posterior 
derogatpriori canon of construction, see HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 206 (Max Knight trans., 2d rev. 
ed., 1967). 
16. See H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 40 (1961) (claiming that the primary function of law is to 
guide action). 
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guidance problems, however, action guidance cannot wholly explain why the rule of law 
includes the Consistency Principle. Moreover, as I explain below, action guidance is not 
even the whole story with irreconcilable inconsistencies. 
A. Improved Taxonomy 
There are four main ways to violate the Consistency Principle. Because we already 
discussed irreconcilable inconsistencies between laws above, we now turn to the other 
three. For each kind of violation, I rely on simple, hypothetical examples. The simplistic 
examples help to illustrate the kind of violation most clearly. Real life has too many details; 
that explains the currency of the old saying about failing to see the forest for the trees. 
1. Reconcilable Inconsistencies between Laws 
The first (new) kind of inconsistency is what I call reconcilable inconsistencies 
between laws. This occurs where Law, sets a standard of behavior, compliance with which 
constitutes non-compliance with Law2, yet compliance with both laws is possible only by 
refraining from the relevant activity or by greater performance when one standard sets a 
lower bar for compliance than the other. 17 Here are some examples. 
Suppose that along a stretch of highway, there was a speed limit of fifty-five miles 
per hour. Suppose also along the same stretch, there was a speed minimum of sixty miles 
per hour. These two laws are clearly inconsistent, but they are not irreconcilably so. An 
irreconcilable inconsistency obtains only when one cannot avoid non-compliance with at 
least one of the laws while remaining in the jurisdiction. Of course, here non-compliance 
is easily avoided: one can choose not to drive at all. Still, this is something that the rule of 
law should forbid. 
Consider another case. Suppose that a law provides that adultery is illegal and 
subject to penalties, while another law in the same jurisdiction, passed on the same day, 
provides that adultery is legal and subject to no penalties. 18 The two laws are clearly 
inconsistent but not irreconcilably so, for one can just avoid committing adultery. This 
case, however, brings out something of note about the perspective from which to judge 
whether there is irreconcilable inconsistency. It is the prospective of the person subject to 
the legal system's demands for compliance. If I lived in that jurisdiction, qua legal subject, 
I would live under inconsistent laws with which I can nonetheless comply. But think of 
the perspective of the police officer to whose attention adulterous behavior is brought. 
Because of her position, she may face different requirements of compliance. Perhaps, the 
officer faces an irreconcilable inconsistency because she is under duty to enforce all and 
only that which has been criminalized. 19 If she arrests someone for adultery, she acts 
17. For Colleen Murphy, the Consistency Principle only provides that "[o]ne law cannot prohibit what 
another law permits." Murphy, supra note 10, at 241. Murphy is plausibly read as talking about reconcilable 
inconsistencies. When one law prohibits what another permits, compliance is still possible, as one might simply 
refrain from doing what is prohibited by the other act. 
18. This example is borrowed from KELSEN, supra note 15, at 207-08. Also, this proceeding point about the 
perspective of the legal official is inspired by Kelsen's well-known claim that law is directed to officials, not 
subjects. 
19. Of course, no law enforcement officer is under such a duty. It would be impossible to fulfill and stupid 
to try because every law enforcement agency must prioritize. 
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contrary to the law that claims that the act is permissible; if she fails to arrest for adultery, 
she acts contrary to the command to arrest for all violations of the criminal law. 
Consider a third case. In this case, I move from duty-imposing laws to power-
conferring laws. 20 Suppose that a statute mentioned the full list of requirements for a valid 
will. Among these is the requirement that testator shall have a witness. Suppose that a 
provision of another statute, passed the same day as the first, requires a testator to have 
two witnesses. These laws are inconsistent, for compliance with the first law - having a 
sole witness - is non-compliance with the second, which requires two witnesses. However, 
the inconsistency is not irreconcilable. A potential testator can get two witnesses, allowing 
her to comply with both laws. Now, if the first law required one to have one and only one 
witness and the second law required two witnesses, the potential testator would be in a 
deeper bind, but this conflict still would not be irreconcilable. She couldjust forgo creating 
a will altogether.21 The mark of irreconcilability is when compliance is impossible so long 
as the person regulated remains within the jurisdiction. 
2. Inconsistencies between the Justifications of Laws 
Another way to violate the Consistency Principle is to have laws with inconsistent 
justifications. A set of laws features inconsistent justifications when the only legally 
permissible reasons for enacting and retaining Law, make it irrational to enact and retain 
Law2. Here is another way to put the point. A set of laws features inconsistent justifications 
when there is no rationally coherent set of legally permissible reasons for enacting and 
retaining Law, and Law2. 
Consider the following example. Suppose that one municipal ordinance (MO 1) 
forbids park visitors from cutting down the trees in the park. Suppose also that another 
municipal ordinance (MO 2) explicitly permits park visitors to burn down trees in the same 
park. This confluence of laws should seem strange. If one considers possible reasons why 
a legislative body would enact MO1, reasons that come to mind may include maintaining 
the park's natural beauty, preventing accidents, retaining natural sources of shade, and 
even combating the rise in greenhouse gases. All of those goals are defeated by having 
MO 2. 
To be clear, an instance of such inconsistency cannot be understood as the more 
familiar issue of one law being over- or under-inclusive. 22 A law is under-inclusive when 
it fails to solve all of a problem it sets out to solve. A law is over-inclusive when it 
'remedies' something that was not part of the problem. A set of laws has inconsistent 
justifications when one law develops a remedy for a problem and the other law undermines 
pursuing that remedy or disparages seeing the problem as a genuine problem. An under-
inclusive law may still turn out to be a reasonable law because trying to solve the whole 
problem may turn out to be too cumbersome. An over-inclusive law may also still turn out 
to be a reasonable law because distinguishing between the legitimate and illegitimate 
20. For the distinction between duty-imposing and power-conferring laws, see HART, supra note 16, at 26-
38. 
21. Indeed, most Americans do not have a will. Jeffrey M. Jones, Majority in U.S. Do Not Have a Will, 
GALLUP (May 18,2016), https://news.gallup.com/poll/191651/majority-not.aspx. 
22. I thank Michelle Dempsey for raising this issue and inviting me to clarify this point. 
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targets of the government action may be too costly. 23 A set of laws with inconsistent 
justifications will always be unreasonable because the laws undermine one another, just 
as the law providing that the truant student appear in court undermines the law providing 
that the student appear in school at the same time. 
Having distinguished inconsistency in justification from over- and under-inclusion, 
let us turn to another example to see the role that "legally permissible reasons" plays in 
understanding the phenomenon of inconsistent justifications. Suppose that a state law 
allows former felons to become public schoolteachers ten years after the end of the felon's 
sentence. Suppose that another state law creates an exception to that rule and forever bars 
those convicted of illegal sale or possession of alkyl nitrites, colloquially known as 
"poppers." The first law seeks to strike a balance between shielding children from 
wrongdoers and offering forgiveness to offenders, but the second law essentially, says, 
"No forgiveness for you!" where the you is those who sold or used poppers. These two 
laws are not obviously inconsistent on the level of justification; perhaps the legislature 
thought that poppers are particularly dangerous drugs or that former users or sellers of this 
drug are particularly likely to market the stuff to children. Imagine that neither of these 
claims is true, that these claims are not commonly thought to be true, and that no legislative 
history or preambulatory text suggests that legislators think them true either. The 
legislators in this example are not completely senseless; however, they carved out this 
exception because they know that gay men are the most frequent users and sellers of 
poppers. 24 In essence, the legislature wants a way to prevent gay men from serving as 
schoolteachers, but, suppose again, they cannot achieve this goal directly because of 
constitutional constraints. Were this all so, we would find the two state laws inconsistent 
on the level of justification. There are three possible justifications for having both laws: 
(1) poppers are particularly dangerous, (2) those who used and sold poppers are 
particularly likely to market to children, and (3) those who used and sold poppers are 
disproportionately gay men, who we despise. If reasons (1) and (2) would not be avowed 
by the legislature and if reason (3) is a legally impermissible ground for government 
action, there is no rationally coherent set of legally permissible reasons for these laws. 
My point with the poppers example is not to suggest that the primary problem with 
such laws is violation of the Consistency Principle. Rather, this example helps to illustrate 
how courts should go about the task of divining the justification for a particular legal norm. 
Courts should restrict the possible justifications to legally permissible grounds. If 
constitutional or other legal norms declare that legislators may not rely upon reason x, then 
a court cannot save a set of laws from inconsistency by claiming that legislators justified 
the laws based on x. 
Before concluding this section and moving on to discuss the fourth species of 
inconsistency, I will raise and answer a taxonomic question that one might be wondering 
about. One might wonder whether the various categories of inconsistency are truly distinct. 
23. For example, during an epidemic outbreak, it may be a good idea to quarantine an entire area, as opposed 
to testing each person to see if she is sick, since such testing may risk more infections. 
24. Frank Romanelli et al., Poppers: Epidemiology and Clinical Management of Inhaled Nitrite Abuse, 24 
PHARMACOTHERAPY 69, (2004) ("Inhaled nitrites ('poppers') are also a common class of drugs that have a long 
history of being abused in social settings, particularly among gay and bisexual men."). 
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No, they are not fully distinct. Irreconcilable inconsistencies are distinct from reconcilable 
inconsistencies in the sense that no single situation can both be an instance of one and an 
instance of the other. However, a case of irreconcilably inconsistent laws necessarily 
features inconsistent justifications, and a case of reconcilably inconsistent laws necessarily 
features inconsistent justifications too. To begin to see this point, consider the fact that the 
specific reason for requiring two witnesses for a will (i.e. needing someone to corroborate 
the other witness) tells against any rationale for a law that only requires one witness. 
Indeed, every violation of the Consistency Principle features legal norms with inconsistent 
justifications. With this said, when I use the term inconsistent justifications in the 
remainder of the Article, I shall imply that the legal norms in question do not feature any 
other Consistency-related faults such as irreconcilable inconsistency. 
3. Inconsistencies between the Justification of a Law and Its Execution 
The final kind of inconsistency obtains when there is inconsistency between the 
justification of a law and its execution or enforcement. 25 More formally, the violation 
occurs when the method of executing a law rationally undermines that law. 
Consider the following example. Suppose that a regulatory agency sought to regulate 
the production of widgets by private companies. The agency was charged with crafting 
rules to improve the quality of widgets because good will, competition, and the torts 
system were insufficient motivation to make manufacturers produce safe widgets. The 
agency, in turn, decided to require inspections of the widget factories; however, the 
inspections are self-inspections, and the agency has promulgated no rules to explain how 
such inspections are to be conducted. Clearly, this is one of those 'cat watching the 
henhouse' situations. The justification for having inspections is undermined by allowing 
the companies to do it themselves without guidance. The requirement of inspections has 
to be executed differently if the law is to meet its objective. 
B. Real Life Interlude: Cormega 's Story and Other Stories of Inconsistency 
To prevent anyone from thinking that violations of the Consistency Principle are 
purely hypothetical, I interrupt our theoretical discussion of the proper scope and defense 
of the Consistency Principle to consider several real-life violations including the case with 
which we started, the Copening case. 
Cormega Copening's case features two kinds of inconsistency about justification. 
First, the justification for the corruption of a minor statute, as applied to him, is inconsistent 
with the justification for the allowing him to have sex with Denson. Second, part of the 
justification for criminalizing child pornography is inconsistent with prosecuting 
Copening for this offense. 
Copening's case - and sexting more generally - is not the only arena where there 
are such inconsistencies. This section highlights five violations of the Consistency 
Principle from various places and times. By exploring many violations, we gain a more 
25. Langer & Sauter note this kind of inconsistency too. Langer, supra note 11, at 50 ("Consistency is also 
part of appropriate means. For example, there should be no conflicting exceptions or inherent contradictions 
between a legal norm and its application."). 
TULSA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:15 
concrete understanding of the problem and we understand its scope better. 
1. To Inspect or Not to Inspect? 
In the early 1950s, Ira Cardiff, president of the Washington Dehydrated Food 
Company, was convicted under a provision of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 
(FDCA), 21 U.S.C. § 331(f), for barring federal inspectors from entering his factory.2 6 
However, another section of the FDCA, 21 U.S.C. § 374, authorized inspections only upon 
permission granted by the factory owner in question. When Cardiff successfully appealed 
his conviction, the Ninth Circuit noted the inconsistency, saying, "section 374 gives the 
operator the right to refuse inspection and section 331 (f) warns him that if he exercises the 
right so given him he is liable to imprisonment." 27 In our taxonomy, Cardiff faced a 
reconcilable inconsistency. 28 Cardiff faced inconsistency because complying with § 374 
and thereby exercising his right to exclude constituted non-compliance with § 33 1(f). This 
inconsistency was reconcilable, though, because Cardiff was capable of complying with 
both provisions of the FDCA while remaining within the jurisdiction. He could have just 
let the inspectors inspect. 
2. Crack and Powder Cocaine 
While the inconsistency that menaced Ira Cardiff was obscure and only affected 
factory owners, the next real-life inconsistency is the subject of great public criticism and 
has ravaged the lives of thousands. I speak of the crack and powder cocaine disparity. 
Crack cocaine and powder cocaine are, more or less, the same substance. Crack 
cocaine is made by mixing powder cocaine with water and baking soda and then heating 
the solution.2 9 Both are habit-forming stimulants derived from two species of the Coca 
plant. 
In 1986, President Reagan signed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 into law.3 0 
Among its many provisions, this "Act provided that individuals convicted of crimes 
involving 500 grams of powder cocaine or just 5 grams of crack (the weight of two 
pennies) were sentenced to at least 5 years imprisonment . ,31 In other words, one had 
to have one hundred times as much powder cocaine as crack cocaine to receive the same 
punishment. Given that these are, more or less, the same substance, any disparity should 
seem odd. If there was going to be a disparity, one would think it should go the other way, 
since crack, an admixture, has less of the active ingredient than powder cocaine. On its 
26. Cardiff v. United States, 194 F.2d 686, 687 (9th Cir. 1952), aff'd, 344 U.S. 174 (1952). 
27. Id. at 688. 
28. Technically speaking, of course, the inconsistency arose within a single statute. This fact is not important 
for our purposes here; however, this fact will be relevant when we consider remedies for inconsistencies below. 
When a single statute is inconsistent as the FDCA was in Cardiff's time, we can show that the statute violates 
due process by using the rationality test. As I explain below, the rationality test commonly used in modem 
substantive due process analysis will not work for most inconsistencies since the discordant norms come from 
different statutes. 
29. ACLU, CRACKS IN THE SYSTEM: TWENTY YEARS OF THE UNJUST FEDERAL CRACK COCAINE LAW 1 
(2006). 
30. Id. at 2. 
31. Id. 
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face then, these laws appear to have inconsistent justifications. Whatever reason one has 
for penalizing crack users and dealers at the level one does requires one to penalize cocaine 
users and dealers at an equal or greater level. 
This conclusion comes too fast though. The 100:1 disparity would be justified if 
legislators believed that cocaine had different effects as crack versus powder. 32 Perhaps 
Congress did believe this at one time, but multiple government commissions have proven 
otherwise and have recommended against the disparity. 3 3 What else might make sense of 
the disparity? If the difference in sentencing were race-based, as many have assumed,
34 
this would at least make sense, but it would not rescue the sentencing regime from 
inconsistency. If the Congress endeavored to heap extra penalties on crack users because 
such users tend to be poor Blacks,35 this would not be a legally permissible ground of 
acting. As noted above, we have inconsistency when there is no legally permissible 
rationale for maintaining both laws. 
Finally, it is important to remember that this disparity is no relic of the past. In 2010, 
President Obama signed the Fair Sentencing Act 3 6 into law, which did eliminate the 100:1 
disparity. But it replaced that with an 18:1 disparity. 37 Inconsistency remains. 
38 
3. Saudi Women Operating Vehicles 
Consider another situation of laws with inconsistent justifications. Until recently, 
women in Saudi Arabia were forbidden from driving cars; 39 however, there was no 
restriction on women flying planes in Saudi Arabia.40 Allegedly, the restriction on women 
32. Id. at 4 ('The rapid increase in the use of crack between 1984 and 1986 created many myths about the 
effects of the drug in popular culture.... For example, crack was thought to be so much more addictive than 
powder cocaine ...."). 
33. The United States Sentencing Commission recommended eliminating the disparity entirely in 1995, but 
Congress refused and requested new "guidelines that did not advocate parity." Id. at 6. A second report in 1997 
recommended decreasing the disparity, which Congress again refused. A third report in 2002 again recommended 
decreasing the disparity, and again Congress refused. Id. 
34. E.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF 
COLORBLINDNESS 112-14 (2010). 
35. ACLU, supra note 29, at i ("Because of its relative low cost, crack cocaine is more accessible for poor 
Americans, many of whom are African Americans."). 
36. Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 844, 
960). 
37. Tyler B. Parks, The Unfairness of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, 42 U. MEM. L. REV. 1105, 1108 
(2012). 
38. United States v. Williams, 788 F. Supp. 2d 847, 880 (N.D. Iowa 2011) ("[T]here is still no persuasive 
rationale for maintaining the crack/powder disparity at all, let alone maintaining it at 18:1 ."). 
39. Shannon Van Sant, Saudi Arabia Lifts Ban On Female Drivers, NPR (June 24, 2018, 1:59 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/2018/06/24/622990978/saudi-arabia-lifts-ban-on-women-drivers. There was not a specific 
law that forbade women from driving; rather, there was a national policy of not issuing driver's licenses to 
women, and in turn, any woman caught driving was guilty of driving without a license. 
40. Adam Taylor, An All-Female Crew Lands a Plane in Saudi Arabia. But They Can't Drive From the 
Airport., WASH. POST (Mar. 15, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/03/15/an-
all-female-crew-lands-a-plane-in-saudi-arabia-but-they-cant-drive-from-the-
airport/?noredirect=on&utm term=.d56cle1970ef. To be clear, Saudi Arabia did not merely lack a law 
prohibiting women from flying planes, which one might see as mere oversight. Saudi Arabia explicitly licensed 
women to fly, and much was made of this. Ghazanfar Ali Khan, Female Saudi Pilot Flies High, ARAB NEWS 
(Apr. 29, 2014), http://www.arabnews.com/news/558946. 
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driving was undergirded by concerns about women's safety41 and spiritual welfare. 
42 
These concerns are likely very misguided. Nonetheless, if one has these sorts of concerns, 
what sense does it make to allow women to fly planes? If one opposes women driving 
because they might be exposed to men outside their families, this can happen in a car or a 
plane. Moreover, a woman might fly her plane to a place very far from the protection of 
her family. Also, if one opposes women driving because a woman out on her own might 
be given to sin, (absurd and sexist as such concern may be) this result can just as easily 
obtain if a woman could fly a plane to wherever she wishes. 
4. Amateur Bounty Hunters 
Writing in the Eighteenth Century, Cesare Beccaria criticized the Italian practice of 
placing bounties on criminals' heads and allowing ordinary people to 'retrieve' the 
criminal. As Beccaria put it, this system, designed to counteract lawlessness, produced 
even more lawlessness. 43 We can be even more specific than Beccaria. The bounty system 
was designed, not to counteract lawlessness in general, but lawless killing in particular. 
However, as Beccaria noted, giving people license to kill someone they suspect is the 
fugitive results in more lawless killing due to mistaken identity, mistaken aim, and 
slaughtered would-be bounty hunters. In our taxonomy, this case features an inconsistency 
between the justification of a law and its execution. 
C. Why Inconsistency Matters 
Having outlined the four basic ways that a legal system can run afoul of the 
Consistency Principle and having provided four real-world examples of inconsistency, I 
now turn to diagnosing the problem with inconsistency. Or, to put the point another way, 
this section defends the Consistency Principle. To begin our work, I first survey and 
dismiss three other theories that try to identify the problem with inconsistency. The first 
three theories discussed below all track real problems, but the specific problem mentioned 
by each theory is not broad enough to encompass the full range of Consistency violations. 
The real problem is that one is disrespected when one's polity violates the Consistency 
Principle. 
1. The SAG Defense 
As a first pass, one might contend that inconsistencies are problematic because, in 
41. Neil MacFarquhar, Saudis Arrest Woman Leading Right-to-Drive Campaign, N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 
2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/24/world/middleeast/24saudi.html ("Many opponents were religious 
puritans who object to the very idea of women being exposed to strangers outside their homes by driving."); 
Hassan M. Fattah, Saudi Arabia Debates Women's Right to Drive, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2007), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/28/world/middleeast/27cnd-drive.html ("Clerics and religious conservatives 
maintain that allowing women to drive would open Saudi society to untold corruption. Women alone in cars, 
they say, would be more open to abuse .... "). 
42. Saudi Woman to Get 10 Lashes for Driving a Car, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Sept. 27, 2011, 3:12 PM), 
https://www.ebsnews.com/news/saudi-woman-to-get-10-lashes-for-driving-a-car/ ("[T]he ban is rooted in 
conservative traditions and religious views that hold giving freedom of movement to women would make them 
vulnerable to sins."); Fattah, supra note 41 (mentioning arguments that if women drove, they "would become 
wayward"). 
43. CESARE BONESANA DI BECCARIA, AN ESSAY ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS, ch. XXXVI (1764). 
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the paradigmatic case, that of irreconcilable inconsistencies, law no longer seems capable 
of guiding action. Rendering this general thought more specific leaves us with the Simple 
Action Guidance (SAG) Defense. 
SAG Defense: inconsistencies are bad because they render law incapable of guiding 
action at all. 
The SAG Defense is obviously false. Law can guide action even when there are 
irreconcilable inconsistencies. If someone faces legal penalties no matter what she does in 
the jurisdiction in question, the law may encourage her to leave the jurisdiction, to conceal 
herself from law enforcement, or to act so as to minimize the law's harms, say, by 
complying with the legal norm with stiffer penalties, should the penalties differ. 
2. The CAG Defense 
One might hear the preceding list of ways that law might guide someone, despite 
inconsistencies, and think: But that is not guidance in the proper way! It seems strange to 
contend that the law guides someone to conceal herself from law enforcement. This 
intuition should lead one to abandon the SAG Defense in favor of what I call the Clever 
Action Guidance (CAG) Defense. 
CAG Defense: inconsistencies are bad because they render law incapable of guiding 
action as it purports. 
So far, this is extraordinarily vague. Allow me to flesh this out. Although a person 
can react to the law in various ways and therefore, in the weak SAG sense, be guided by 
the law in various ways, there is a stronger sense of being guided by the law. The law has 
a certain set of conventions by which it guides in its official way. For instance, if the law 
criminalizes conduct C, the law condemns C and commands legal subjects not to perform 
C.4 4 This is true even if legal officials were to proclaim that C is a wonderful deed. If law 
influences people's conduct, not in just any way, but specifically by having them comply 
with its commands (commands we interpret via law's conventions), then the law guides as 
it purports, or in the CAG sense. For an illustration, recall the speed limit and speed 
minimum case from above. 4 5 Upon learning that, on that stretch of highway, one would 
be subject to a speed minimum higher than the speed limit, one may decide not to drive on 
that stretch of highway or not to drive at all. In the SAG sense, one is guided by the law, 
but, arguably, one is not guided by the law in the CAG sense. 
Why? Well, in a reconcilable inconsistency, the law does not guide in the CAG 
sense, for there is nothing that the law commands. By having a speed limit or a speed 
minimum, the law accepts that someone will drive along the stretch of highway. In fact, 
the law proclaims that driving is permissible. However, the contents of the speed limit and 
speed minimum together contradict that permission. In criminalizing driving above fifty 
44. This is an old insight from punishment expressivists like Feinberg. See generally, Joel Feinberg, The 
Expressive Function of Punishment, 49 THE MONIST 397 (July 1965). 
45. Supra Part II.A.I. 
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miles per hour and driving below sixty miles per hour, the law condemns driving altogether 
along the stretch of highway. The law, thus, proclaims that driving on that stretch is 
permissible and not permissible. In the same way that stating a contradiction conveys no 
information, 4 6 the law says nothing at all about driving along that stretch. Thus, it cannot 
4 7 guide. 
I very much endorse CAG as a way of understanding legal norms, but the CAG 
Defense-that the Consistency Principle must be observed, so that law can guide in the 
way that it purports-cannot be the full story. This is not a full defense of the Consistency 
Principle. Even in those cases where law does guide subjects' behavior as it purports, we 
can still have instances of inconsistency, particularly laws with inconsistent justifications. 
Where laws with inconsistent justifications persist, the law does not, through its 
conventions, proclaim that the very same conduct is permissible and impermissible. 
Instead, Law, says some conduct C, is permissible, while Law2 says some other conduct 
C2 is impermissible. The law can thus command something. The problem with such 
commanding is that there is no legally permissible rationale for allowing C1 while 
prohibiting C2. 
If the foregoing is correct, we must look beyond action guidance and must seek a 
broader explanation of the fault that Consistency violations entail. 
3. The Kludge Defense 
Moving beyond the action-guidance points, we might locate the problem with 
inconsistency in the inefficiency and lack of accountability that usually accompanies it. 
To make this suggestion vivid, I rely on an insightful article from Steven Teles. 
48 
Teles develops a framework for understanding how government works in America 
today. America is a kludgeocracy, that is, a form of government wherein most policies are 
kludges. A kludge, as Teles cites from the Oxford English Dictionary, is "an ill-assorted 
collection of parts assembled to fulfill a particular purpose.. .a clumsy but temporarily 
effective solution to a particular fault or problem." 4 9 As Teles explains, kludges are bad 
because they cost a lot, hide how government works, and have no overarching rationale. 
This last point connects up with our concern about the Consistency Principle. 
Extrapolating from Teles, we should expect a kludgeocracy like ours to feature 
inconsistencies. 
Now, Teles is not trying to diagnose the problem with inconsistency. He is pointing 
out a deep problem with the institutional design of the American government, namely that 
when federalism (with overlapping magisterial), separation of powers, and super-
majoritarian procedures combine, we get inefficient government that is not properly 
46. Manuel Bremer, Can Contradictions Be Asserted?, 7 LOGIC & LOGICAL PHIL. 167, 169 (1999) ("[A]n 
antinomy asserts nothing."). 
47. I thank Chad Flanders and Mihailis Diamantis for pushing me to explain this point. This explanation not 
only helps me set up and knock down a potential defense of the Consistency Principle. It also helps further 
explicate what is inconsistent about reconcilable (and irreconcilable) inconsistency. Before the explication in the 
text, one might be tempted to think that there is something merely inconvenient about the situation. Now, it 
should be clearer that in those inconsistencies, the law speaks with two voices, canceling itself out. 
48. Steven M. Teles, Kludgeocracy in America, NATIONAL AFFAiRs, Fall 2013. 
49. Id. 
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accountable. One might depart from Teles's limited goals, however, and develop a defense 
of the Consistency Principle based on his arguments. In particular, one might argue that 
inconsistencies are bad because a) they signal upstream kludges and b) they, themselves, 
cause inefficiency and lacks of accountability. Call this the Kludge Defense. 
Those who might advocate for the Kludge Defense or some other related concern 
(e.g. one cannot plan one's affairs if everything one does is criminalized), they note a real 
problem with inconsistency, but, like the action-guidance defenses before it, this defense 
is too narrow. Inconsistencies need not involve kludges. The crack/powder cocaine 
disparity has nothing to do with kludges; it has everything to do with harming a politically 
unpopular group. Also, inconsistencies need not to be inefficient. Whenever efficiency is 
mentioned as a concern, one must always remember that a means is never inefficient 
simpliciter, it is inefficient to a particular end. As such, some means are inefficient to one 
end but very efficient for another end. Inconsistencies like the crack/powder cocaine 
disparity might be inefficient to the end of stopping drug abuse, but it might be very 
efficient for another more nefarious purpose, like re-enshrining Black subjugation. 50 
4. The Disrespect Defense 
To understand the general problem that all inconsistencies occasion, we have to 
think more expansively and, in particular, more jurisprudentially. In jurisprudential 
conversations, we are often looking for what distinguishes law from other behavior 
guiding systems. 5 1 For instance, jurisprudence scholars ask about the difference between 
law and club-rules 52 or the difference between law and morality. 5 3 Most important for our 
purposes, we might think about the difference between law and the demands of a 
54 
mafioso.
By mafioso, I mean something rather peculiar that may depart from actual mafias. I 
stipulate that law is different from the demands of the mafioso in that law features a 
legitimating narrative. In our lives as legal subjects, there must be reasons why we are 
subject to particular demands, reasons that have to do with promoting important values, 
such as safety, freedom, equality, piety, prosperity, and the like. To the extent that the 
demands are not even thought to track these values, legal subjects live under the arbitrary 
50. One, of course, need not accept this particular claim about drug policy to appreciate and accept my general 
point: inconsistency is not necessarily inefficient; thus, inefficiency cannot be the problem with inconsistency. 
51. Danny Priel, The Boundaries of Law and the Purpose of Legal Philosophy, 27 L. & PHIL. 643,646 (2008) 
("Much of what descriptive legal philosophers are concerned with is the question of boundaries, that is, the proper 
way of distinguishing between those things in the world that are laws and those things in the world that perhaps 
bear some resemblance to law but nonetheless are not laws .... They do so by looking at legal practice and by 
trying to distinguish it from other normative practices and systems of norms (etiquette, rules of clubs, social 
norms, morality and so on)."). 
52. For a discussion of characteristics of law that particularly distinguish it from club rules, see RAZ, supra 
note 10, at 116-20. 
53. See, e.g., HART, supra note 16, at 181-207; Mark C. Murphy, The Explanatory Role of the Weak Natural 
Law Thesis, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE NATURE OF LAW 3 (Wil Waluchow & Stefan Sciaraffa 
eds., 2013). 
54. For an early discussion of the difference between law and thugs who make demands on us, see HART, 
supra note 16, at 19-23. For more recent discussion on the difference between organized crime and legal systems, 
see SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY 215-16 (2011). But see, Matthew Kramer, Requirements, Reasons, and Raz: 
Legal Positivism and Legal Duties, 109 ETHICS, Jan. 1999, 375, 393-95 (eliding the mafia/law distinction). 
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whims of others, 55 or, more colorfully, they live under the thumb of a mafioso. Ultimately, 
mafiosos are under no compunction to justify their various demands; 5 6 their swords and 
guns have the last word. To live under law, by contrast, the demands on our freedom 
imposed by legal officials - these have to be undergirded by reasons, and the reasons given 
by the officials have to be reasons that can do the justificatory work, at least by the 
officials' light. Otherwise, we just have lying mafiosos. When the 'legal' system treats us 
as involuntary clients of lying mafiosos, we are disrespected. 57 We are treated as mere 
means for the pursuit of others' ends.
58 
It is not important that we investigate the beliefs and desires of each and every legal 
official in our jurisdiction to determine whether we are disrespected in this way. Rather, 
as legal subjects, we should be able to look at our legal system as a whole and affirm it as 
something that is decidedly not the mere whim of mafiosos. That means that the full set of 
legal norms has to be undergirded by a coherent set of reasons. Otherwise, we should infer 
we live under a mafia, under people who are not bound to give us reasons. This, no doubt, 
sounds dramatic, but consider how inconsistent legal norms sound to someone bound by 
them. The North Carolina government told Copening they were protecting his privacy by 
showing his naked photos to a host of adults, releasing his name for journalists and others 
to see, and threatening to put him on a sex offender registry. This would be hilarious if it 
were not tragic. 
III. PUTTING THE CONSISTENCY PRINCIPLE TO WORK 
Part I of this Article sought to expand our understanding of the Consistency 
Principle, to demonstrate real-world violations of the Principle, and to explain why the 
Principle is important to uphold. Though as the old adage goes, "The philosophers have 
only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point, however, is to change it."' 59 In 
keeping with this point, Part II shifts to developing a theory of legal relief for those harmed 
by legal inconsistencies. 
A. Due Process is the Remedy 
Violations of the Consistency Principle are violations of due process of law. 
Therefore, to remedy inconsistencies, those harmed by them ought to challenge their 
55. A line from Joseph Raz is especially helpful here: "[A]n act which is the exercise of power is arbitrary 
only if it was done either with indifference as to whether it will serve the purposes which alone can justify use 
of that power or with belief that it will not serve them." RAz, supra note 10, at 219. 
56. As Scott Shapiro notes, "When organized crime happens to solve moral problems, these occurrences are 
treated by us as serendipitous, as happy accidents. By contrast, the moral benefits generated by ajust legal system 
are not accidental or side effects of legal activity; rather, producing them is the very point of its activity." 
SHAPIRO, supra note 54, at 216. 
57. Again, Raz helpfully explains this intuition: "[O]bservance of the rule of law is necessary if the law is to 
respect human dignity. Respecting human dignity entails treating humans as persons capable of planning and 
plotting their future ... respecting their autonomy, their right to control their future." RAZ, supra note 10, at 221. 
While Raz is talking generally about the rule of law, what he says applies specifically to the Consistency 
Principle, an element of the rule of law. 
58. IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDING FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALs, at Ak. 429 (James W. Ellington 
trans., 3d ed. 1993) ("Man, however, is not a thing and hence is not something to be used merely as a means."). 
59. Karl Marx, Theses on Feuerbach, in THE MARX-ENGELs READER 143, 145 (Robert C. Tucker ed., 2d ed. 
1978). 
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convictions or adverse administrative adjudications in courts on Due Process grounds. 60 
If the defendant were successful, a court need not resolve the inconsistency; instead, the 
court would exempt the prevailing defendant from the adverse consequences. 
While fairly straightforward and general, advocating for this Due Process remedy is 
likely to raise several questions. First, one might wonder what kind of due process 
violation this is, procedural or substantive. Second, one might wonder why inconsistencies 
violate due process in the first place, whether construed as procedural or substantive. 
Third, before accepting this theory of relief, one might wonder about other alternatives. 
Answering these three concerns sets the agenda for this section of the Article. 
I argue below that inconsistency is problematic on both procedural and substantive 
conceptions of due process. Concededly, the case may be stronger on the side of procedural 
due process, but there is a good case on both fronts. After completing the argument for 
Due Process remedy, alternative remedies are considered. As I demonstrate, none of the 
surveyed remedies has the generality, clarity, and finality of the Due Process remedy. 
1. Rule of Law Violations as Procedural Due Process Violations 
As courts see it, the requirement to afford all people due process of law has tw6 
components, procedural due process and substantive due process. Roughly, in procedural 
due process analysis, a court asks whether, in the course of depriving someone of "life, 
liberty, or property," 6 1 Government has engaged in the correct procedures, while in 
substantive due process, a court asks whether the deprivation itself was undue, apart from 
the procedures used to carry out the deprivation. 
Accordingly, procedural due process might be seen as guaranteeing that the rule of 
law (understood in a thin, formal way) will be respected in a particular jurisdiction. To 
demonstrate the connection between procedural due process and formal accounts of the 
rule of law, I enlist the help of Lon Fuller. In his influential work from the 1960s, Fuller 
provides a list of eight formal rule of law principles. 62 Courts have already held that several 
of these principles are requirements of procedural due process. The Consistency Principle, 
which is on Fuller's list, has not been fully incorporated into procedural due process, but 
it ought to be, for it is of no less moment than the other Fullerian principles that courts 
have already adopted. By parity of reasoning, courts should declare inconsistency to be 
antithetical to procedural due process. 
Fuller's eight principles are as follows. 
63 
CONSISTENCY: the laws in a jurisdiction must be mutually consistent 
ENFORCEMENT: the published version of laws must accord with how they are 
enforced 
60. Maybe prohibitory injunctive relief could be warranted too, but settling that questions takes us far afield 
from the present inquiry, which is simply the general constitutional remedy. 
61. U.S. CONST. amend. V; id. amend. XIV, § 1. 
62. FULLER, supra note 6, at 38-39. 
63. The preceding list paraphrases other scholarship on Fuller. Raff Donelson & lvar R. Hannikainen, Fuller 
and the Folk: The Inner Morality of Law Revisited, in OXFORD STUDIES IN EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHY, VOL. 3 
(T. Lombrozo, J. Knobe, & S. Nichols eds., forthcoming 2019). It is important to note that some scholars 
understand Fuller as offering rule of law principles (what makes for good law), some take him to offer conditions 
of legality (what makes a norm a legal norm), and some, like myself, see his principles as doing double duty. 
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GENERALITY: laws must be general rules of conduct 
INTELLIGIBILITY: laws must be capable of being understood by legal subjects 
POSSIBILITY: laws may only require those acts subjects are physically capable of 
performing 
PROSPECTIVITY: in regulating conduct, law must be prospective 
PUBLICITY: laws must be publicly announced 
STABILITY: law may not change too frequently 
Current understandings of fair notice, which is a requirement of procedural due 
process, 64 incorporate a good deal of these Fullerian principles. Courts typically hold that 
65 
unintelligible laws do not provide fair notice and thereby violate procedural due process. 
Court have also held that retrospective laws can fail to provide fair notice and thereby can 
violate procedural due process.66 Fuller's publicity principle has been understood 
similarly. 67 Similar arguments have been advanced for the possibility principle. 68 There 
are independent constitutional provisions that guarantee generality, 69 but even the 
rationale for those provisions traffics in procedural due process language. 
The foregoing should provide strong reason to conclude, by parity of reasoning, that 
courts should see consistency as a part of procedural due process too. If that is not enough, 
there is some limited (but on-point) precedent for seeing inconsistency as violating 
procedural due process. Recall the case of Cardiffv. United States. The summary of his 
case above focused on the 9th Circuit decision, 70 but Cardiff s case reached the Supreme 
Court.7 1 The Court affirmed the 9th Circuit and held that the reconcilable inconsistency 
afflicting Cardiff violated procedural due process. The Court relied on a fair notice theory 
doing so. As I explain below, calling this a failure of notice is misleading. 
72 
in 
Nonetheless, this case shows that the Court has recognized that legal inconsistencies are 
an affront to procedural due process. 
2. Inconsistent Laws as Irrational Violations of Substantive Due Process 
In substantive due process review, a court asks whether a denial of "life, liberty, or 
64. Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 228 (1957) ("Engrained in our concept of due process is the 
requirement of notice."). 
65. Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) ("[A] statute which either forbids or requires the 
doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and 
differ as to its application violates the first essential of due process of law."). 
66. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 266 (1994) ("The Due Process Clause also protects the 
interests in fair notice and repose that may be compromised by retroactive legislation."). 
67. Cendant Corp. & Subsidiaries v. Dep't of Revenue, 226 P.3d 1102, 1109 (Colo. App. 2009), as modified 
on denial ofreh "g (Colo. App. 2009) ("There can be no secret laws because they violate very basic considerations 
of due process.") (internal quotations omitted). 
68. United States v. Gresham, 118 F.3d 258, 262 (5th Cir. 1997) (mentioning that some courts have held "it 
would violate due process to convict a defendant for violations of a statute when compliance with it 
is legally impossible" then holding otherwise). 
3; § 10, cl. 
simply declaring that some named parties are to receive ill treatment. This suggests commitment to the idea that 
law ideally functions as setting out general rules of conduct, rules that parties can use to regulate their behavior, 
rules that a judiciary might use to determine compliance. 
69. The Bill of Attainder Clauses (U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 1) generally prevent legislatures from 
70. See supra Part II.B.1. 
71. United States v. Cardiff, 344 U.S. 174 (1952). 
72. See infra Part III.A.3.c. 
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property" was undue, apart from the procedures used to carry out the denial. To make this 
determination, courts must first make a determination about the character of the right 
denied. The right in question may be fundamental or not. If the right is fundamental, a 
court will use strict scrutiny as its standard of review; that is, the court will inquire whether 
infringing on the right was done to advance a compelling state interest and whether this 
method of advancing the state interest was narrowly tailored to achieving that goal. When 
the right is fundamental, unless the court finds both a compelling state interest and narrow 
tailoring, the deprivation violates substantive due process. If the right is not fundamental, 
courts employ the more deferential rationality test. On this standard of review, the court 
inquires whether infringing on the right might advance any legitimate state interest and 
whether using this method was rational. When the right is not fundamental, unless the 
court finds that the state action was a rational means of achieving some legitimate state 
interest, the deprivation violate substantive due process.73 
Given this framework, how might inconsistencies figure? As noted above, all 
inconsistencies are inconsistent at the level of justification. That means that there can be 
no legitimate reason for the state to act as it does. There can be a legitimate reason for the 
state to adopt one law and a legitimate reason to adopt another law, but, if there is an 
inconsistency, there is can be no legitimate reason that could explain a polity having both 
laws in force at once. 
If this much is right, it means that all inconsistencies fail rationality review. Now, as 
things stand, courts only consider the rationality of one legal norm at a time, but nothing 
should prevent them from inquiring about a set of laws. If they did, they would see that 
some would fail. 
3. Issues with Other Theories of Relief 
Above I sketched two arguments for the claim that courts should deem all violations 
of the Consistency Principle to be violations of due process, both procedural and 
substantive. Of course, this theory is not the only possible one. Scholars, courts, and 
activists have suggested several other ways to remedy violations of the Consistency 
Principle. Below, I consider five other theories and explain why the Due Process solution 
is best. 
a. First Amendment 
The first alternative remedy to consider looks to a different constitutional provision. 
Instead of taking a due process approach, one might argue that the North Carolina sexting 
law violates the First Amendment.7 4 This approach may appear to be a non-starter, for it 
is no secret that courts have long recognized that the First Amendment does not protect 
obscene materials in general75 and explicit images of minors in particular. 76 Some scholars 
73. The preceding overview of substantive due process can be found in many places; one of the best is ERWIN 
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 814-18 (4th ed. 2011). 
74. Professor Mary Anne Franks is quoted making this argument in Miller, supra note 3. 
75. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 481 (1957) ("[T]his Court has always assumed that obscenity is not 
protected by the freedoms of speech and press."). 
76. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763 (1982). 
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have offered persuasive arguments to narrow those precedents; 7 7 nevertheless, three 
additional problems would remain, even if one were to convince courts to read the First 
Amendment differently. 
First, even if sexting laws do violate the First Amendment, this will not help those 
who encounter other laws that violate the Consistency Principle. Sexting may well be the 
most visible issue that involves possible violations of the Consistency Principle, but it is 
not the only area where violations exist. Other violations of the principle may not be 
amenable to a First Amendment fix. For instance, the aforementioned disparity in 
sentencing for powder and crack cocaine possession is also a large and widespread 
problem that has persisted for decades. Since there is no First Amendment interest at stake 
in cocaine prohibition, a First Amendment remedy would be inapt. 
At this point, a proponent of the First Amendment remedy might concede that her 
solution is partial and yet insist that the path forward is to use the First Amendment in 
conjunction with other theories to address new violations of the Consistency Principle as 
they arise. This emendation of the First Amendment remedy suggests a second problem. 
Using ten theories to address a singular constitutional evil is an unwieldy strategy, one not 
to be employed when a categorical approach like the due process approach is available. 
Third, the First Amendment remedy fails to address the constitutional violation at 
issue. The issue at hand, even in the sexting case, is not the curtailment of expression. 
Rather, the issue is that jurisdictions are treating legal subjects unfairly by imposing 
inconsistent laws. A First Amendment remedy misses that point. This criticism may seem 
academic or pedantic, but there is a practical upshot. The First Amendment remedy is a 
proxy remedy. Proxies, by their very nature, only approximate what the true antidote can 
accomplish, and as such, proxies should not be used when one can just as easily use a 
solution that can directly and completely address a problem. 
b. Cormega 's Law and Other Legislative Fixes 
The First Amendment strategy is ill-suited to remedy violations of the Consistency 
Principle because settled case law speaks against this strategy, because it cannot reach all 
instances of inconsistency, because using it as a partial remedy is wieldy, and because the 
strategy misses the point. Similar worries plague a second possible remedy for violations 
of the Consistency Principle. Copening's mother advocated for a legislative fix to the 
specific problem faced by her son. She imagined calling the legislation that would permit 
teens to sext "Cormega's Law." 
78 
The most obvious problem with this legislative fix is its narrow scope. Cormega's 
Law, were it enacted in North Carolina or across the United States, would not reach all 
violations of the Consistency Principle. As noted above, sexting does not exhaust the scope 
of the problem. There are three ways that one might amend the legislative fix to address 
the narrowness: (1) One might propose a new law to address each inconsistency as one 
77. E.g., John A. Humbach, "Sexting" and the First Amendment, 37 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 433 (2010). 
78. Paul Woolverton, Sexting Charges Dismissed for Fayetteville Teenager, FAYErEVILLE OBSERVER (July 
7, 2016, 12:01 AM), http://www.fayobserver.com/bae76802-8b76-542b-9cd5-f0671cee3d47.html. It is unclear 
from the journalistic report whether Copening's mother advocated for a law that would outright permit teen 
sexting or whether she merely wanted a law with less strict penalties for the behavior. 
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finds it in the particular jurisdiction in which it arises, (2) one might propose that Congress 
and each state pass a single law that nullifies all instances of inconsistency, or (3) one 
might hope for a single piece of legislation that purports to nullify all instances of 
inconsistency. These emendations to the legislative fix invite new worries. 
The first two emendations should be rejected as too unwieldy. Employing strategy 
(1) could require countless new laws over time. Under (2), we need fifty-one new laws. 
Though fifty-one is more manageable than the untold number of laws that might be needed 
under (1), any scheme requiring fifty-one different sets of legislators to agree should be 
rejected if a more practicable option exists. Option (3) is the most promising, but it is beset 
by federalism problems. This contemplated single piece of legislation would have to be a 
piece of federal law. If it were not federal law, it clearly could not remedy instances of 
federal law that violate the Consistency Principle because state and local lawmakers cannot 
repeal or otherwise invalidate federal law.79 Moreover, no states can bind other states. 80 
However, even if it were a piece of federal legislation, purporting to bind all federal, state, 
and local lawmakers, there would be a different federalism problem: Congress has no 
power to regulate every area of state law. 
8 1 
c. Notice 
A more promising and more general approach is to suggest that there is a failure of 
notice when laws violate the Consistency Principle. Even from the perspective of someone 
advocating for a due process theory, the notice theory has two advantages: first, notice 
requirements are part of the requirements for due process, and thus, the notice theory is a 
due process theory, and second, the Supreme Court has used a notice theory to strike down 
a conviction when the defendant faced a reconcilable inconsistency. 82 
Two problems attend the notice theory. First, current understandings of the notice 
requirement cast doubt on the willingness of courts to extend the theory to inconsistent 
justifications writ large. Second, just as a matter of semantics, it seems false to say that 
one has insufficient notice when the laws in question are clear, public, and relatively 
longstanding. I develop these two points in turn. 
While courts have claimed that irreconcilable and reconcilable inconsistencies 
provide inadequate notice to legal subjects, I know of no case where the notice doctrine 
has been extended to inconsistent justifications. This means that using a notice theory to 
cover all varieties of inconsistencies would be an innovation. Innovation is not a bad thing, 
79. Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. 506, 516 17 (1858) (holding that states cannot nullify federal law). 
80. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 571 (1996) ("[I]t is clear that no single State could ... 
impose its own policy choice on neighboring States."); Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor 
Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 582 83 (1986) ("[One state] may not project its legislation into other States.") (internal 
citations and brackets omitted); Bonaparte v. Appeal Tax Court of Bait., 104 U.S. 592, 594 (1881) ("No State 
can legislate except with reference to its own jurisdiction."). 
81. Of course, there is a theory on which Congress could regulate all areas of state law to attempt to remedy 
all inconsistencies: it could claim that it was relying on its enforcement power granted by the Fourteenth 
Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. This theory, of course, requires that inconsistencies run afoul of 
some Fourteenth Amendment guarantee. Thus, this legislative fix presupposes the correctness of some other 
theory, which means that it is incomplete. Coincidentally, if my Due Process remedy is correct, Congress could 
then pass statutes to try to stamp out inconsistencies. 
82. United States v. Cardiff, 344 U.S. 174 (1952). 
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but if part of the draw of the notice theory is that courts are already doing something like 
that, this attraction is only partially right. 
That courts have not extended the fair notice doctrine to cover inconsistent 
justifications should not be surprising, for it seems patently false to claim that one has no 
notice of what Government will do in many cases of inconsistency. To see this, consider 
the speed limit/minimum case. Along that stretch of highway, if one drives, one runs the 
risk of getting caught for breaking one of those traffic laws. If this silly confluence of laws 
were longstanding, it would be disingenuous to contend that one had no notice in the 
normal sense of the word. Consider also the crack/powder cocaine disparity. A disparity 
in some form has been in place for over thirty years. Anyone who receives punishment for 
dealing crack had notice. Make no mistake, those who face inconsistent laws have been 
harmed, but their harm is the disrespect that legal inconsistency necessarily occasions, not 
the harm from a failure of notice. 
d. Equal Protection 
The next alternative remedy to consider is an equal protection theory. To understand 
how this remedy is supposed to work and why it is ultimately too limited, we must set out 
in brief modern equal protection doctrine. 
Under modern equal protection doctrine, courts evaluate whether government action 
violates the Constitution's guarantee of equality by reference to three standards of review: 
strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and rational basis review. 83 Strict scrutiny, 
appropriate when the government action classifies on the basis of "race, alienage, or 
national origin" or when the classification infringes on a fundamental right, requires the 
government to show that the classification is narrowly tailored to furthering a compelling 
government interest. 84 Intermediate scrutiny, appropriate when the government action 
classifies on the basis of sex, gender, or legitimacy, requires the government to show that 
the classification is substantially related to furthering an important government interest. 85 
With the caveat for claims involving fundamental rights, the heightened forms of scrutiny, 
strict and intermediate, are appropriate only when the government employs suspect 
classifications, presumptively invalid classifications based on characteristics such as race 
and sex. Rational basis review is appropriate for all other classifications. 86 Under rational 
basis review, the government must show that the classification is rationally related to 
furthering some permissible government interest. 87 
Certain violations of the Consistency Principle also violate the Equal Protection 
Clause. Schematically, this occurs when one legal norm provides some benefit to Group 
A, another legal norm denies the benefit to Group B, and there is no permissible legal 
83. See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988). 
84. City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Clebume Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985); see also, Loving v. Virginia, 
388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967). 
85. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996); see also, Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 
U.S. 718, 724 (1982). 
86. See, e.g., City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442 (mental ability); Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 
313 (1976) (age); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973) (socioeconomic status); 
Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla. Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955) (profession). 
87. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996). 
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reason for the exclusion. 88 Thus, some legal norms that violate the Consistency Principle 
would also fail rational basis review under the Equal Protection Clause. However, the 
important word in the previous sentence is some. There are many ways to violate the 
Consistency Principle without following the structure of giving a benefit to one group and 
withholding it from another. For instance, consider the irreconcilable inconsistency 
offered at the outset, that of the student who must appear in court and appear in school at 
the same time. This example features irrationality, but not an irrational classification. The 
same is true of our speed limit/minimum example, for that case too features no irrational 
classification. Indeed, many irreconcilable and reconcilable inconsistencies will not 
violate the Equal Protection Clause. Laws with inconsistent justifications are those most 
likely to violate the Clause. 
The Equal Protection remedy is thus partial. It cannot reach all instances of 
inconsistency. As noted above, ceteris paribus, partial remedies are to be rejected when a 
complete remedy, like the Due process remedy, is on hand. 
e. Canon of Statutory Construction 
The final alternative remedy I consider is the suggestion that courts should, as a 
matter of statutory construction, never read laws such that they violate the Consistency 
Principle. 89 Call this the canon of statutory construction remedy, or the canon remedy. The 
canon remedy is born from the thought that it is more controversial to claim that the 
Constitution provides defense to parties adversely affected by inconsistencies than merely 
to claim it is good policy to read legal texts so as to avoid inconsistency. 
Two additional facts further support using the canon remedy. First, we already have 
several canons that do similar work, so it would not be a great departure from current 
practice. For instance, as noted above, lexposterior derogatpriori allows courts to defuse 
many irreconcilable and reconcilable inconsistencies. Also, the Absurd Results doctrine, 9 0 
which allows courts to avoid legal outcomes that both seem required by the plain language 
of a statute and patently absurd, could help courts in situations involving laws with 
inconsistent justifications and maybe even inconsistencies between a law and its 
enforcement. Because courts already have such tools, this is not uncharted territory, so 
encouraging courts to use this remedy to avoid violations of the Consistency Principle 
should not seem particularly risky. A second fact in support of the canon remedy is that it 
appears to be a general way to uphold the Consistency Principle, unlike some of the other 
proposed strategies. 
Despite its benefits, the canon remedy is limited, not in scope but in power. To see 
this, I begin by noting a familiar fact about canons of construction. Canons of construction 
are defeasible. Noted scholars have contended that canons must sometimes give way to 
other canons or to the dictates of commonsense. 9 1 Few would deny that canons must also 
88. See, the poppers example, supra Part ll.A.2. 
89. 1 owe this suggestion to Michael Coenen who first mentioned it to me. 
90. For an overview of the doctrine and a few central cases, see Andrew S. Gold, Absurd Results, Scrivener 's 
Errors, and Statutory Interpretation, 75 U. CtN. L. REV. 25, 53-56 (2006). 
91. E.g., Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About 
How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REv. 395 passim (1950). 
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give way to a legislature that insists on a particular construal of its legislation. 92 This latter 
point is instructive for thinking about how the canon remedy would work in practice and 
for seeing the limitation of this remedy. If the canon remedy were in use and were applied 
to a set of irreconcilable criminal laws, it would allow a court to interpret the inconsistent 
laws such that the criminal defendant would not be liable for not complying with one law 
in the set. Essentially, the court would claim that one of the criminal laws at issue is to be 
read as exempting parties from criminal liability if the party's criminal action was 
compelled under threat of criminal penalty. Suppose that, after a court hands down its 
ruling, the legislature writes a new law expressly disclaiming any such exemption. At this 
point, a court would not be free to employ the consistency canon again, to read in 
exemptions that the legislature deliberately withheld. Thus, the canon remedy can only go 
so far if a legislature is committed to violating the rule of law. 
The canon remedy is, then, a provisional kind of solution to violations of the 
Consistency Principle. The Due Process remedy, by contrast, is final. Short of changing 
our constitutional structure, no one will be able to disregard courts' attempts to stamp out 
consistency violations. For those partial to the canon remedy, I should note what might 
count as an added bonus for the Due Process remedy: courts will regularly read statutes 
such that they do not contravene the Consistency Principle because of the constitutional 
avoidance canon. 93 Thus, these two strategies will, more or less, coincide. 
B. Objections 
Several worries attend the kind of cause of action for which I advocate. First, one 
might worry that there might be too many inconsistencies, such that no one can be 
prosecuted for anything. Second and alternatively, one might worry that any seeming 
inconsistency can be made consistent, such that this theory of relief will help no one. Third, 
one might wonder whether there is positive value to having inconsistencies in the legal 
system, value that might be lost, were my theory to be accepted. Fourth, one might worry 
that this theory of relief empowers the judiciary too much. 
1. Too Many Violations? 
According to the first worry under consideration, violations of the Consistency 
Principle abound. Perhaps they are inevitabilities. During periods of transition, a legal 
system will take on new legal norms that are out of sync with the old. Some of the old will 
face repeal because of its repugnancy to the new way of thinking. However, some of the 
old will persist, innocuous enough to the new order, but still not susceptible to 
rationalization within the new paradigm of thought. If this happens and happens all the 
time, so this objection continues, I am suggesting that we swim against the tide, but such 
92. As the Court noted about the absurd results canon, "[j]udicial perception that a particular result would be 
unreasonable may enter into the construction of ambiguous provisions, but cannot justify disregard of what 
Congress has plainly and intentionally provided." Comm'r v. Asphalt Prods. Co., 482 U.S. 117, 121 (1987). 
93. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932) ("When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in 
question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will 
first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided."). 
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is a fool's errand.94 
There are two ways to respond to this worry. One can deny that violations are so 
numerous, or one can bite the bullet and say that we ought to combat violations even if 
they lurk at every turn. I shall take the first path, for true inconsistencies are less common 
than a potential objector might think. It is implausible to suggest that irreconcilable 
inconsistencies are everywhere. The most plausible version of this objection suggests that 
laws with inconsistent justifications are everywhere. To see that this too is an exaggeration, 
I consider two situations where significant inconsistencies seem to arise, but I show how 
the seeming inconsistencies can be resolved. The proceeding test cases should allow us to 
see that many seeming consistency problems can be similarly defused. 
The first case concerns abortion. Legal abortion and fetal homicide laws appear to 
be in tension. To put the point more formally, one might think there is an inconsistency 
between permitting abortions and criminalizing as murder the intentional killing of a fetus 
by someone other than a mother or her agents. 95 One might see inconsistent justifications 
because one might believe that the only justification for permitting abortions is that fetuses 
are not persons and further that the only justification for criminalizing as murder the 
intentional killing of a fetus is that fetuses are persons. 96 This seeming inconsistency can 
be fixed, as there are justifications for abortion that grant the personhood of fetuses. 97 One 
might justify abortion by holding that fetuses have no moral right to a woman's bodily 
resources, just as a sick patient may have no moral right to a hospital's resources - even if 
denial of such resources would result in the respective person's death. Still, so this 
justification would continue, it would be wrong for someone else to murder the fetus or 
sick patient once the mother or hospital has decided to extend support for the furtherance 
of the respective person's life. 
The second case concerns a heart-wrenching story involving a family raising a child 
with severe mental illness. 98 Jim and Toni Hoy adopted Daniel as a toddler and raised him 
alongside their other three children. Though Daniel was a typical toddler, after a few years, 
the young boy began having violent outbursts. The Hoys sought medical attention but often 
to no avail because their private insurance would not cover the mental health care Daniel 
needed. Daniel's condition continued to deteriorate, and, in one incident, he threw his 
brother Chip "down the stairs and punched him over and over before their dad pulled the 
94. The foregoing is my best reconstruction of an excellent point raised by Etienne Toussaint. 
95. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1841 and Ala. Code § 13A-6-1 for laws that criminalize this way. 
96. For a version of this argument, see Arina Grossu, Fetal Homicide Laws and the Logical Inconsistency of 
Abortion, FAMILY RESEARCH COUNCIL (Mar. 7, 2014), https://www.frc.org/op-eds/fetal-homicide-laws-and-the-
logical-inconsistency-of-abortion. 
97. E.g., Judith Jarvis Thomson, A Defense of Abortion, I PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 47 (1971). The proceeding 
argument in the text is a variant of Thomson's arguments in that article. For a similar point made thirty-four years 
later, see Carolyn B. Ramsey, Restructuring the Debate over Fetal Homicide Laws, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 721, 724 
(2006) ("Proponents of legal abortion have much to lose by agreeing to conduct the debate about reproductive 
rights within a framework that hinges on the status of the fetus and thus sidelines the threat to the pregnant 
woman's autonomy."). 
98. Christine Herman, To Get Mental Health Help for a Child, Desperate Parents Relinquish Custody, NPR 
(Jan. 2, 2019, 2:31 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2019/01/02/673765794/to-get-mental-
health-help-for-a-child-desperate-parents-relinquish-custody. I thank Colin Miller for bringing this case to my 
attention. 
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boys apart." 99 When the Hoys again came to a hospital, seeking help for Daniel, they were 
turned away because of their inability to pay. More bad news was to come that day, for the 
Illinois Department of Children and Family Services told Mrs. Hoy, "If you bring him 
home, we're going to charge you with child endangerment for failure to protect your other 
kids ... [a]nd if you leave him at the hospital, we'll charge you with neglect." 100 
This second case may sound like it features an inconsistency. 10 1 If the Hoys take 
Daniel home, they break the law; if they leave him where he is in the hospital, they break 
the law. This would be an inconsistency of some kind, were the only two places in the 
world the Hoy household and the hospital. Of course, this is not so. There were lots of 
other options: they could have left Daniel with a relative or friend who does not have 
children, one parent could have gotten a second home to raise Daniel away from the other 
three children, or they could have done what they, in fact, did do. Jim and Toni 
relinquished their custody of Daniel, so that he would become a ward of the state and 
receive the medical attention he needed for free. No doubt this was a tragedy. No one 
should minimize this, but, if the preceding is correct, what happened to the Hoys was no 
violation of the Consistency Principle after all. 
2. Can't Anything Be Made Consistent? 
The foregoing response to the first objection, however, makes defending against the 
second objection all the more difficult. One might worry that an ingenious government 
attorney will always find a way to make sense of why a jurisdiction should have two laws, 
even if there is a seeming tension between said laws. This weighty objection merits a more 
thorough response than I can provide, so my response will be partial. 
The due process argument I propose is much like rationality review used in both 
substantive due process jurisprudence and equal protection jurisprudence. While 
rationality review is easy to satisfy in many cases, 102 it is not toothless. Likewise, what 
one might call Consistency Review would be easy to satisfy in many cases, but it, like 
rationality review, would not be toothless either. 10 3 If the most ingenious government 
attorneys sometimes lose on rationality review, which they do, 104 there is no reason to 
99. Id. 
100. Id. 
101. Colin Miller suggested this to me both in person and online, Colin Miller (@EvidenceProf), TWITTER 
(Jan. 3, 2019, 9:48 PM), https://twitter.com/EvidenceProf/status/1081034583712374785 ("[A] Catch-22: take 
him and you're committing a crime; DON"T [sic] take him home & you're committing a crime."). This is also 
how Mr. Hoy himself understood his experience, for he said of the Department of Family and Children Services' 
ultimatum, "[t]hey put our backs against the wall, and they didn't give us any options." Herman, supra note 98. 
102. Jeffrey D. Jackson, Classical Rational Basis and the Right to Be Free of Arbitrary Legislation, 14 GEO. 
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 493, 494 (2016) ("[A]lmost any possible legislation can be justified under modem rational 
basis review."); Raphael Holoszyc-Pimentel, Reconciling Rational-Basis Review: When Does Rational Basis 
Bite?, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2070, 2071 (2015) ("Rational-basis review, the most deferential form of scrutiny under 
the Equal Protection Clause, rarely invalidates legislation."). 
103. Robert C. Farrell, Successful Rational Basis Claims in the Supreme Court from the 1971 Term Through 
Romer v. Evans, 32 IND. L. REV. 357 (1999) ("This Article addresses successful rational basis claims under the 
Equal Protection Clause in the Supreme Court. These cases are sufficiently rare to stand out as unusual, but they 
do exist."); Katie R. Eyer, The Canon of Rational Basis Review, 93 NOTRE DAMEL. REV. 1317, 1341-53 (2018) 
(arguing that we only view rationality review as ineffectual and overly-deferential owing to myopic focus on 
Supreme Court cases, to the exclusion of state court cases). 
104. In Holoszyc-Pimentel, supra note 102, at n.2, we get a list of cases where the Supreme Court has held 
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doubt that some will lose on consistency review too. 
My response to this worry essentially says, "we must admit that some combinations 
of laws are provably irrational if we accept that some single laws are provably irrational." 
One can pretend that this response is fully satisfying, but I am more candid. Like with any 
proposed remedy, one can only speculate on how courts might employ this. Maybe it will 
be dead-letter, if adopted. There is no theoretical reason why that should be the case, but 
as the great Dostoyevsky once quipped, "A thousand things may happen in reality which 
elude the subtlest imagination."
10 5 
3. The Value of Incoherence 
The third objection rests on the idea that there is positive value to retaining 
inconsistencies in the law. If there is such value, so this objection goes, getting rid of all 
inconsistencies through the due process solution is wrongheaded. On its face, claiming 
that we need to have inconsistency in the law can sound outlandish, but this objection is 
something to take seriously. One might develop this objection by talking about the value 
of federalism. Even if one dislikes federalism, it is stitched into the very fabric of American 
constitutionalism. As such, it would be very bold to suggest that the Due Process Clause 
requires jettisoning federalism. 
To see how inconsistency and federalism concerns relate, consider the following 
example. Several states permit the recreational use of marijuana or its medicinal use, while 
the federal government bans its use for either medical or recreational purposes. Here we 
have what appears to be a straightforward reconcilable inconsistency, for someone 
'lighting up' in Denver, her conduct is permitted under state law but prohibited under 
federal law. If there is an inconsistency here, it is the product of federalism: when one has 
two independent legislatures, they can and reliably will reach different results at least 
sometimes. 
This objection, though primafacie compelling, rests on a mistake. It is not clear that 
there is a reconcilable inconsistency in the marijuana case. Because the federal government 
has limited powers1 0 6 and because of the Supremacy Clause, 10 7 it should not be possible 
for a state and the federal government to regulate the same conduct in disparate ways. 
Either the federal government is regulating in a domain where it has legislative jurisdiction 
or it is not. If it has legislative jurisdiction, conflicting state laws are null via the Supremacy 
Clause. If it lacks legislative jurisdiction, it is federal overreach, and the state law should 
stand. On the specific question of marijuana, the Court has already spoken, and federal 
that a law violated Equal Protection, using rationality review: United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 
(2013); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); Quinn v. Millsap, 491 U.S. 95 (1989); Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal 
Co. v. Cty. Comm'n, 488 U.S. 336 (1989); City of Cleburne v. Clebume Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 
(1985); Hooper v. Bernalillo Cty. Assessor, 472 U.S. 612 (1985); Williams v. Vermont, 472 U.S. 14 
(1985); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869 (1985); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982); Zobel v. 
Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982); U.S. Dep't ofAgric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973); James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 
128 (1972); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 
(1972); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 
U.S. 71 (1971). 
105. FYODOR DOSTOYEVSKY, THE BROTHERS KARAMAZOV (Bk XII, Ch. XI). 
106. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9; id. amend. X. 
107. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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law does preempt state law on this score. 
This tidy response to the federalism objection skirts around some complicated 
issues. The response above provides that the structure of American federalism itself does 
not allow inconsistencies to arise because superseding measures prevent state and federal 
law from ever conflicting. This way of dissolving the federalism objection is actually more 
controversial than it might appear at first blush. As a matter of contemporary practice, 
federal and state law regulate the very same conduct in disparate ways on a number of 
issues, creating what appear to be reconcilable inconsistencies that no courts think to 
invalidate. For instance, under the federal Controlled Substances Act, simply possessing a 
small amount of marijuana, say ten grams, is punishable by up to a year in prison for a first 
offense; 109 however, under Louisiana law, simply possessing ten grams of marijuana 
carries a maximum sentence of fifteen days, if it is one's first offense. 1 10 If one thinks of 
the United States as a single jurisdiction, we have a reconcilable inconsistency, for in the 
same polity, the law claims that for a given act, one can be jailed for only fifteen days and 
up to one year. These two norms are in obvious conflict. One can resolve this conflict by 
denying that the nation is one jurisdiction. In fact, courts have long held that state and 
federal governments are separate sovereigns for criminal justice purposes. If Louisiana 
and the federal government are separate sovereigns, there is no inconsistency, for the 
Consistency Principle only regulates the goings-on within a single jurisdiction. It would 
thus appear that, again, the structure of American federalism itself does not allow 
inconsistencies between state and federal law to arise; this time because discrepancies 
between state and federal law count as laws from different jurisdictions, which is not an 
issue the Consistency Principle aims to address. But is that so? Can it be reasonable to 
treat the laws of Louisiana and federal law as coming from separate sovereigns, such that 
when they conflict, they pose no greater rule of law problem than differing laws in 
Mongolia and Malawi? If one answers the preceding questions in the affirmative, the 
federalism objection neatly dissolves. If one answers in the negative, as I would, one can 
still dissolve the federalism objection but at a cost. One would have to say, as claimed 
above, that the Constitution bars states and the federal government from regulating the 
same conduct in disparate ways. That not only means that states cannot legalize what the 
federal government permissibly forbids (and vice versa), but it also means that the state 
cannot be lenient on matters the federal government takes seriously (and vice versa). 
4. Judicial Activism 
The final objection to be considered is a worry about the potential for judicial 
activism, should courts attempt to eliminate inconsistency from American law. In its most 
plausible version, this objection admits that irreconcilable and reconcilable inconsistencies 
should be subject to judicial review and rectification, but the objector would draw the line 
there. The objector would contend that the other two categories of inconsistency -
inconsistent justifications and inconsistency between a law's justification and its 
enforcement - are too political. To find that two laws cannot rationally accommodate one 
108. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005). 
109. 21 U.S.C. § 844. 
110. LA. STAT. ANN. § 40:966(C)(2)(a). 
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another is to make a subjective, political decision, one might think. In our system of 
governance, we do not entrust judges with such decisions. Such decisions should remain 
with the political branches of government, the executive and the legislature, for they, not 
judges, are democratically accountable. Call this the Judicial Activism Complaint. Below 
I advance two responses to the Complaint. 
The first response is to reject the main premise of the Complaint, namely that judges 
are not democratically accountable as a general matter. Were laws reviewed for 
consistency, as I advocate, many cases would likely come before state courts. As I envision 
it, most of the people who would litigate consistency concerns would be appealing criminal 
convictions, convictions for violating state law. In particular, the average criminal 
defendant bringing such an action would contend that the justification of the state statute 
under which he was convicted was inconsistent with either the method of prosecuting him 
or with the justification of some other state statute. In the envisioned situation, allowing 
courts to resolve this problem would not be undemocratic because "[t]he majority of state 
court justices and judges in this country are elected."111 Of course, we can imagine 
consistency issues also arising in federal courts; if so, the Complaint rears its head again. 
However, we must be careful here. While federal judges are appointed, they are appointed 
by elected officials in a process that is highly politicized; thus, it is hard to claim that the 
demos has no input. 
This first response is unlikely to convince those who would press the Judicial 
Activism Complaint. Potential objectors can concede that judges have some democratic 
accountability yet still worry that my proposal gives judges, bearing too little democratic 
accountability, too much leeway to decide matters based on personal whims, rather than 
law. 
Here I shift, then, to the second response to the Complaint. Allowing Consistency 
review will empower courts no more than employing current rationality tests. Courts, both 
state and federal, already ask whether laws rationally advance their conceivable objectives 
under rationality tests, which are components of both Equal Protection and Substantive 
Due Process analyses. All this Article proposes is that courts make the same inquiry about 
a larger set of laws. If Equal Protection review is not to be trucked over worries about 
judicial activism, neither should Consistency review. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This Article has sought to fill a gap in both our legal understanding and practice. 
Though previous writers have discussed legal inconsistency, this Article has offered a 
more comprehensive view of the phenomenon, by differentiating the various kinds of legal 
inconsistency, highlighting several of its instances, and explaining why avoiding 
inconsistency matters. I have argued that there are four kinds of legal inconsistencies: 
irreconcilable inconsistency, reconcilable inconsistency, inconsistent justifications, and 
inconsistency between a law's justification and its enforcement. I argued that all of these 
are problematic because, when a polity allows inconsistencies to persist, it disrespects its 
111. Sandra S. Newman & Daniel M. Isaacs, Historical Overview of the Judicial Selection Process in the 
United States: Is the Electoral System in Pennsylvania Unjustified?, 49 VILL. L. REV. 1, 13 (2004). 
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legal subjects, tells them that they do not deserve to be given reasons for the various legal 
demands placed on them. In responding to the gap in our practice, no one has fully 
theorized what remedies for inconsistency might exist under American law. I have put 
forward a Due Process solution. Though this may not be the last word on either the 
descriptive or remedial fronts, I hope to have pressed the conversation forward. 
